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SKYJACKING AND AIRPORT SECURITY
R. S.

MAURER*

There has been a noticeable decline of airplane hijackings in
recent years. In this speech given on March 22, 1973, Mr. R. S.
Maurer examines the various factors that have brought about this
trend. Mr. Maurer draws upon his experience as an officer of Delta
Air Lines to relate the history of skyjacking. He then examines
the methods developed by the airlines and the federal government
to meet this problem and the constitutional and practical consequence of those methods.

I. THE PROBLEM OF SKYJACKING

p

IRACY has occurred in all stages of history. The piracy--or
hijacking-of an airplane is a concept as alien to us in the
airline industry as it is to the traveling public. The policy problems
involved for our federal government invoke international problems of types not focused upon since the days of the infamous
Barbary pirates of the seventeenth century.
From our earliest days, the airline industry has invested both
its capital and its labor in a continuing effort to make passenger
boarding and handling procedures as convenient, as rapid, and as
efficient as possible. Now, under pressures arising from the legal
necessity of taking all reasonable efforts to protect the safety of
our passengers, and under federal directives about the nature and
extent of those efforts, we must resort to measures that in many
ways work to negate that speed and convenience.
Insofar as economic efficiency is concerned, suffice it to say
that despite the increased costs incurred by the airlines and by
* A.B., Ohio Wesleyan University; J.D., Yale University School of Law. Mr.
Maurer is presently the Senior Vice President-General Counsel of Delta Air Lines,
Inc. Mr. Maurer expresses his appreciation to Sidney F. Davis and Gerald M.
Mayo of the Georgia Bar for their help in preparing this article.
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airport managements in implementing these security programs,
until March 14th the CAB refused to permit even an interim
increase in fares to cover those expenses,1 estimated to be over
one hundred million dollars per year for the industry The result
inevitably has been a deteriorating profit position for a large number of airline companies which are not yet earning that level of
return on investment which the CAB itself has held in the minimum for the financial health and continuing growth of these companies.
By way of introduction to my comments on the legal rights of
those exposed to security procedures, let me tell you about a few
of my own company's experiences in the hijacking field. We have
had fifteen legitimate hijacking attempts. Seven have been successful-six going to Cuba and one to Algeria.
These were widely covered by the media at the time of their
occurrence. But, with the peculiar judgment exercised with respect
to what is and what is not front page news, little if any coverage
has been extended to the eight instances when the attempted
hijacking was thwarted while in progress, and vritually no coverage has been given to the ultimate fate that befell those hijackers
who were provided gratuitous transportation to their desired destinations or to those hijackers whose attempts were thwarted.
We have been deluged, however, with a great deal of wellintentioned advice about how we should handle hijacking cases in
those instances when the criminal has penetrated our initial security barriers. To illustrate the variety of factual situations with
which airline management is confronted, and the difficulties faced
in assuring our passengers of our exercise of the "highest degree
of care" imposed upon common carriers by the law, let me outline
the facts about a handful of our actual experiences.
Our tenth hijacking attempt occurred on May 25, 1970, when
Delta Flight 199, an early morning departure out of Atlanta
destined for Miami, was diverted to Havana. The hijacker was
ICAB Order No. 73-3-46 indicated a willingness to accept tariff filings imposing approximately 34g per enplanement as an average carrier cost for implementing the federally-prescribed security program. Subsequent CAB orders have
permitted tariff filings imposing a total charge of 640, on a temporary basis, pending final determination of the lawful rate, to cover both the carriers' and the air-

craft operators' security costs. See CAB Order No. 73-5-12.
*See Am TRANSPORT WORLD, Mar. 1973, at 17.
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later identified as a twenty-eight-year-old, female Cuban alien, who
was accompanied by her eleven-year-old son. Shortly after the
flight reached cruise altitude, this relatively young woman approached the forward stewardess wielding a Smith and Wesson
revolver, with instructions in broken English to proceed to Havana. The flight crew observed that the woman displayed an
extremely nervous condition. In addition, despite the fact that she
had assumed a well-positioned stance beyond grappling reach, the
crew was able to see that there were bullets in the chamber of
the revolver. As a result, the flight proceeded to Havana as requested. While an indictment has been returned in federal court,
this hijacker's return to the United States is not expected.
By unusual coincidence, a Mexican airliner, hijacked only the
night before, had not yet departed Havana at the time of the
Delta flight's arrival at the Havana Airport. And to further compound the coincidence, as the Delta flight started its engines for
the return trip to the United States, an American Airlines Boeing
727, also hijacked, made an approach and landing at the Havana
airfield.
Three months later on August 20, 1970, Delta Flight 435, a
DC-9 with seventy-eight passengers on board was forced to Cuba,
this time by a lone black male carrying a black attache case allegedly cointaining an explosive device. Under the circumstances, the
flight crew did not require physical confirmation of the explosive
content. The flight proceeded to Havana and the attache case was
confiscated by the Cuban authorities.
On March 31, 1971, while Delta Flight 400 was boarding
passengers in Birmingham, Alabama, a fourteen-year-old, white
male, flaunting a loaded revolver, pushed his way onto the aircraft and demanded that he be taken to Cuba. The flight crew
and a gate agent stalled the flight for over an hour and, with the
aid of a stewardess, convinced the juvenile to relinquish his gun
and surrender.
In April of 1972 shortly after take-off of a Delta flight from
West Palm Beach to Chicago, a middle-aged, white male, sitting
in the aft section of the tourist compartment, passed a note to
one of our stewardesses stating that he possessed a gun, wanted
$500,000 upon landing in Chicago and direct air transportation
from Chicago to Nassau. The note also requested that the crew
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"act normal." Upon landing in Chicago, and after convincing the
hijacker to allow the passengers to deboard, the First Officer stalled
departure for more than an hour while he talked the hijacker
into surrendering.
Occasionally, hijacking will have humorous aspects. This one
did. The hijacker in this incident stated that his gun was contained
in a paper sack which covered his right hand. The hijacker's initial
note was handed to a stewardess along with two one dollar bills
for the purchase of a beverage. The stewardess, quite busy at the
time and assuming that the note was-as usual-either a proposition or a complaint, tucked the note into her apron pocket while
she continued taking orders. This occurred shortly after take-off
from West Palm Beach en route to Chicago. Beverage orders were
completed, change returned to numerous passengers, including the
hijacker, and meal service was begun. Almost one hour later, our
stewardess read and acknowledged the note. I can only imagine
that the hijacker regretted having asked the crew to act normal.
The paper sack was later determined to be empty. One can also
wonder at the helplessness of a hijacker whose threat was inadvertently ignored when an empty paper sack was the only weapon
at his disposal!
On another occasion, in January of 1972, Pacific Southwest
Airlines had one of its smaller jet aircraft in California commandeered to Cuba. Due to the short range of the aircraft, the flight
landed at Tampa for refueling. During the approach, the Pacific
Southwest pilot radioed the Tampa tower that the hijackers desired
to transfer to a larger, four-engine aircraft capable of long-distance,
over-the-water flights. During this period, Delta Air Lines had the
sole four-engine aircraft on the airfield, preparing for departure
from Tampa. Tower personnel informed our Station Manager of
the request. Within minutes, all passengers were deboarded, the
flight crew dispatched to downtown motels, hydraulic jacks were
placed under the wings of the aircraft and cowlings stripped from
two engines. Mechanics proceeded to dismantle an engine. The
aircraft was obviously and effectively grounded for mechanical
reasons. Needless to say, the "down" status of the Delta aircraft
did not change until the short-range Pacific Southwest aircraft had
departed for Cuba.
Perhaps our most widely-publicized encounter with hijackers
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occurred this past August. Delta Flight 841, Detroit to Miami, with
ninety-four passengers on board, was held for one million dollars in
ransom. Following release of the passengers, the aircraft was forced
to Algeria, where hte hijackers remain today. They have not as yet
been granted asylum, and our latest information indicates that they
continue to express their extreme displeasure with the living conditions and personal restrictions imposed by their Algerian hosts.
On this occasion, the hijackers consisted of three men, two women,
-and three children, members of a black revolutionary group. Their
disregard for personal safety if their extortion demand was not
met and their requested destination was not reached was readily
apparent to our flight crew and was immediately transmitted to
our flight supervisors on the ground.
The idea of a "shoot-out" with five armed, adult revolutionaries
on a DC-8 jet aircraft loaded with passengers was not entertained
for long, despite prompting about alternate procedures from certain
sources. The receipt of extremely profane threats to the effect that
a deadly countdown was about to be undertaken eliminating passengers one by one, was sufficiently convincing to us that we
promptly set about collecting one million dollars in small bills. This
was not an easy task on the spur of the moment, but our best judgment was that this was not an appropriate occasion to try to set an
example of undue heroism.
As you may be aware, Delta merged with Northeast Airlines
the first day of last August. Unfortunately, on July 31st the hijacked flight became Delta's inaugural flight from Miami to Boston
via Algeria.
The aircraft and crew arrived safely in Algeria. The crew and
aircraft returned the following day. The ransomed million dollars
was taken from the hijackers by the Algerian government immediately after landing, and returned to Delta several weeks later.
Communications between Delta and the Algerian government were
friendly and cordial-after translation, of course.
As can be seen from the foregoing examples of purely Delta
experiences, there is no longer what one could call a "typical"
hijacker, if indeed there ever was one. Through the decade of
the sixties, the commonality that most hijackers shared was their
destination-Cuba. Based on recent experience, however, it appears that the commonality of the Cuban destination is a thing of
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the past and has been replaced by the desire to raise large sums
of money, either for personal or vengeful motives.
Furthermore, the recent (February 15, 1973) signing of an
executive agreement (not requiring Senate ratification) between the
United States and Cuba calling for either extradition or imposition
of "severe punishment" on persons using one country as a base to
mount a violent attack against the other,' is most helpful. As a
practical matter, Cuba is now foreclosed as a destination for all but
the most pathological hijackers who attempt to leave the United
States.
With this background, a brief review of the statistical history of
the hijacking of U. S. aircraft is in order.
In terms of total numbers, hijackings are a comparatively recent
phenomenon. For example, during the thirty-seven year period from
1930 through 1967, it appears that there were a total of only twelve
hijacking attempts in the United States, of which seven were carried
out successfully."
For record-keeping purposes, the FBI and the FAA seem to
generally agree that the tone for the modem hijacking syndrome
was set on May 1, 1961, when a National Airlines Convair 440
on a scheduled flight from Miami to Key West was hijacked to
Cuba. Since that date there have been 160 recorded hijacking
attempts of registered U. S. aircraft.'
From the National incident through 1967, hijacking attempts,
both unsuccessful and successful, were sporadic. In fact, during
the three-year period 1962-64 and the two-year period 1966-67,
there were no attempted hijackings of commercial air carriers in
the United States.!
Beginning in early 1968, hijackings of commercial air carriers
began at an alarming and almost epidemic rate. As the year progressed, it became increasingly obvious to those in both industry
and government that a threat of unknown magnitude, with the
3 Almost simultaneously with the signing of the U.S.-Cuban accord, it was
announced that the Cuban and Canadian Governments also entered into an agreement similar to the U.S.-Cuban pact. Aviation Daily, Feb. 16, 1973, at 258.
See FAA OFFICE OF AIR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, SUMMARIZATION OF
WORLD WIDE REPORTING HIJACK ATTEMPTS, Feb. 1, 1973.
5
Id.
Id. In 1962, 1964, and 1967, there was one hijacking in each year of a charter
aircraft from either Miami or Hollywood, Florida to Cuba. There were no hijacking attempts in the United States in 1963.
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capacity to literally paralyze the air transport system of the United
States, was in the making.
By late 1968, a task force was appointed to consider a unified
method of dealing with the problem of hijacking. This task force
was comprised of persons both in the airline industry and in government wtih specialties in law enforcement, psychology, law, and
administration. As a result of the work of this group, by early
'[972 the so-called "hijacker profile" was implemented by the airlines under federal directive in an effort to stem the alarming increase in attempted hijackings. In practice, most of the carriers
actually started using the profile on their own initiative in early
1971.
While the motives (or lack thereof) and psychological makeup
of would-be hijackers vary widely, it was found from the task
force study and from common experience in the industry that those
persons most likely to attempt a hijacking shared certain common
habits or traits, sufficiently common to warrant further investigation
of persons evidencing one or more of these traits while attempting
to board an aircraft. Since the profile is still a limited part of our
present security system, no detailed discussion of its composition
is permissible. I should like to note parenthetically, however, that
contrary to popular misconception, racial or ethnic origin is not a
formal part of the profile officially adopted by the carriers.' On
the other hand, while the profile has scientific reliability, there do
exist sufficient exceptions to make it only partially effective.
While the profile and other detection methods used by the airlines received unofficial government approval, prior to 1972 there
existed no real, direct government participation in the implementation of airport security, although armed federal law enforcement
officials began riding on U. S. air carriers operating over international routes in 1970. U. S. Marshals also frequently were available at ticket counters and other screening stations to assist agents
of the airlines in case of trouble and occasionally assisted in the
I Cf. Whet v. American Airlines, Determinationand Order Alter Investigation,
New York State Division of Human Rights, involving a black who filed a complaint charging racial discrimination because he was subjected to a personal search
by U.S. Marshals before being permitted to board an American flight from New
York to Chicago. The Commission held that no discrimination was involved and
noted that three other prospective passengers, all white, were not permitted to
board the flight after having been subjected to the same procedures.
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normal inspection of those persons who met the profile. At some
international points of debarkation, customs agents also assisted
in the pre-departure screening of passengers and in some instances
actually carried out the physical search of carry-on luggage of
those who met the profile or did not pass the magnetometer test,
to the extent magnetometers were then in use.
Prior to the end of 1971, of the previous 124 hijacking attempts,
there had been only one in which extortion was involved. Then
in November 1971, the infamous "D. B. Cooper" extortion of
two hundred thousand dollars from Northwest on a flight from
Portland to Seattle set the theme for the hijacking menace of the
year 1972. Of the thirty-one hijacking attempts involving United
States aircraft in 1972, a full eighteen, nearly sixty per cent of the
total, involved extortion attempts, ranging from fifty thousand dollars to five million dollars each.'
There were twenty-seven hijacking attempts in 1971 and thirtyone in 1972.' By late 1972 it had thus become apparent that the
security precautions implemented by the individual airlines, even
as supplemented by the presence of "sky marshals" on some flights,
were not achieving the success required to deter hijackings.
As a result, in December 1972 the Administrator of the FAA
amended Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations," which
now has as its basic theme the securing of the perimeters of the
airport by each airport operator, limiting access to personnel in
operating areas of the airport, and otherwise calling for each airport to develop its own master security plan, including identification procedures and other steps designed to protect parked aircraft. Dovetailing with the amendments to Part 107, the Administrator also amended Part 121,1 directing air carriers to develop
security plans for their entire operation, finding as follows:
I find that an emergency exists requiring immediate action with
respect to safety in air transportation and air commerce. Therefore,
in accordance with §121.538 the security program... is hereby
amended effective January 5, 1973, without stay, to include the
following minimal acceptable procedures:

'See

note 3, supra.

1ld.
10 14 C.F.R. § 107 (1973).
1114 C.F.R. $ 121 (1973).
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1. The certificate holder shall not permit any passenger to board
its aircraft unless:
A. The carry-on baggage items are inspected to detect weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects, and
B. Each passenger is cleared by detection device without inindication of unaccounted for metal on his/her person
(hand metal detection units may be used until walkthrough units are available), or
C. In the absence of a detector, each passenger has submitted
to a consent search prior to boarding.
It is seen, then, that the carriers are now required by federal
regulation to visually inspect items of carry-on luggage and to
clear the person boarding an aircraft either by a detection device
or a personal search. Conceptually, with the airport operator now
responsible for the integrity of the perimeters of the airport under
]Part 107 and the airlines responsible under Part 121 for their
specific operating areas, we have now arrived at what is popularly
called a "sterile passenger concept," which means that every revenue passenger, without regard to age, color, sex, appearance or
any other criteria, is to be subjected to a personal search before
he or she is permitted to enter the boarding area of an aircraft.
Is the "sterile passenger concept" working? To say the least, it
is helping. Through the end of March 1972 there were seven air
carrier hijacking attempts, only one of which was successful in
diversion to Cuba, and six of which ended with the would-be
hijackers shot or captured. In 1973 to date there has been just
one attempted hijacking, unsuccessful, which occurred before the
amendment to Part 121 became effective.
Only time will tell if the present system is really successful, and
as I will discuss in a few moments, there are many seminal issues
involved in arriving at a one hundred per cent foolproof system
for the deterrence of hijackings. Suffice it to say at this point that
the results of the present operation, although costly and time consuming, lead us in the industry to a bit of cautious optimism about
the future.
Let me digress just a moment to talk about what happens to
hijackers who are captured and brought to trial, an area where I
believe the media has been grossly remiss in not insisting upon the
widest possible exposure.
In 1972, the minimum sentence imposed on a convicted hijacker
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was twenty years imprisonment. Of the fourteen hijackers prosecuted in 1972, the results are as follows:1"
(i) three were given life sentences;
(ii) one received a sentence of forty-five years;
(iii) one received a sentence of forty years;
(iv) one received a sentence of thirty years;
(v) five received a sentence of twenty years; and
(vi) three are undergoing pre-sentence study.
This contrasts sharply to the relatively mild sentences which convicted hijackers received in the 19 6 0's and represents a growing
recognition by the courts of the heinous nature of the crime.
II.

SKYJACK PREVENTION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Turning now to the strictly legalistic questions, in our society
any type of system that imposes a personal search on an individual, no matter whether that search be consensual or not, has
repugnant overtones, at least in the abstract. A serious legal
question has arisen whether the fourth amendment to the Constitution, consistent with our mobile society with its emphasis on
individual rights, can tolerate the search of a person as a precondition to his mobility by air. I think the answer is a clear "yes."
Not surprisingly, to date there have been only a limited number
-of cases dealing directly with the issue of whether a pre-boarding
search of a passenger can be held to be consensual in nature and
whether the fruits of such a search can be used as evidence in
-crimes, whether or not related to a crime committed on board
the aircraft. When a passenger enters an airport, he is almost
immediately put on notice by large, conspicuously-posted signs
that both his person and any luggage that he may be carrying
on board an aircraft with him will be subject to search before he
is permitted to board. Normally, the hand luggage a person may
be carrying is subject to a visual inspection by opening and examining the contents by private individuals who have been hired
by the airport or the airline for the purposes of conducting such
searches, and the passenger himself is asked to walk through a
magnetometer which will determine whether he has an accept12

' OFFICE OF THE
MEETING
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able or unacceptable level of metal on his person, an unacceptable level meaning a reading high enough to indicate the possibility of a concealed weapon. If the magnetometer reading is high
enough, the person is then asked to submit to a frisk or "patdown"
by these agents.
Let me emphasize at this point that so far as I am aware, and
certainly in the case of Delta, it is the standard operating procedure
for the carriers not to detain or press upon any person not wishing
to submit to a search of his person or his baggage. The simple
fact is that he must understand that, absent such search, he cannot proceed on board the aircraft or penetrate more deeply into
the sterilized area.
The alarming increase in hijackings over the past few years has
already been documented; the dangers presented to innocent bystanders of these crimes are apparent. Therefore, when these obvious dangers are combined with the inherent difficulties in attempting to prevent hijackings, an individual's expectation of privacy
or freedom from questioning or search should not be as high when
boarding an aircraft as it is in other places, as on the street or in
his home. 3
It may be, then, that the question of consent is not even germane
to the issue, insofar as it involves passenger pre-boarding of airlines. Unless he is truly illiterate, a person can hardly fail to
observe the many conspicuous notices given him that he will be
searched if he attempts to go past a certain area in the airport.
Presumably, therefore, the passenger knows exactly what he is
getting into at the time he reaches the area where the search is
being conducted; he is free to desist from going further at any
time. Even if he refuses to submit to the search at the place where
it is conducted, standing instructions are to deny him further access
to the boarding area, but without further action.
Is there, however, some point of no return after which a person
will have attracted enough suspicion to himself to be questioned
or searched further? I think, realistically, that there is. Consider
the situation when a passenger has had his hand luggage cleared,
but after walking through the magnetometer there is a reading
13People v. Botos, 27 Cal. App.3d 774 (1972). See also United States v.
Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971); Comment, Airport Security Searches and
the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1039 (1971).
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that indicates the passenger is carrying metal of sufficient density
to be a weapon. Assume that he then refuses to consent to a personal frisk or "patdown" by the airport security agents. Theoretically he should be given the option of having his luggage returned
and told that he cannot proceed further.
But let us assume that a zealous agent is concerned about this
would-be passenger and, exercising his own judgment, calls over a
law enforcement officer who theretofore had not been assisting in
the searches or inspection, but had merely been standing by in
case of trouble. The only basis for calling over the officer has been
the fact that the magnetometer reading was high and the individual
refused to submit to a personal search. The officer then asks the
individual to accompany him to a more remote area for either
interrogation or a personal search or both. I think it is a fair premise that at this point he is legally in custody, although not
actually arrested, and the consensual nature of further search is
placed in issue." Although one case seems to hold that the mere
fact of the defendant's being in custody when he consents to a
search is sufficient to render the consent invalid unless the government can point to some affirmative indication of voluntariness, 5
there are many cases supporting the conclusion that a person may
validly consent to a search even though the consent is given while
he is in custody and that the fact of custody does not inherently
render the consent invalid.'"
There are other factors, of course, that relate to the conduct
of the search if a person is in custody. For example, if the search
is conducted only after coercion, deceitful conduct on the part of
the officers conducting the search, or even the failure of the officers
to inform the suspect of his constitutional rights, one must consider the guidelines laid down in Miranda" which, although dealing
14The

word "arrest" includes "custody" but the converse is not necessarily

so. The term "custody" normally indicates the situation in which an individual's
freedom of movement has been restricted, as by . . . instructing him to accompany officers to a certain place, . . . but in which he has not been placed under
formal arrest. Validity of Consent to Search Given by One in Custody of Officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858 (1966).
15 U.S. ex rel. Holloway v. Reincke, 229 F. Supp. 132 (D.C. Conn. 1964).
" United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962). See also state cases
cited in 9 A.L.R.3d 873 (1966).
11Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 870
(1966).
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with the admissibility of confessions taken from an accused while
he is in custody, would implicitly have ramifications in the area of
consent to a search and seizure given in similar circumstances,
especially in view of the Court's assertion that:
[U]nless adequate protection devices are employed to dispel a
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice."
Thus there may be some doubt cast upon the continuing applicability of those cases which hold that searches while in custody
can be voluntary, because Miranda presents the basic issue of
waiver of constitutional rights by an accused while in custody,
which is the same issue underlying the search and seizure cases. I
submit, however, that there is a substantial difference in the typical
situation of taking a person into custody on the streets and the
one involving a person who, up to a point, has voluntarily and
knowingly placed himself in the position of a possible search and
then refuses to permit the search to be carried out in its entirety.
The Supreme Court has stated that there is no ready test for
determining reasonableness of a search other than by balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search itself
entails." I am confident that the balance lies heavily in favor of
the need to search to protect as contrasted with the invasion that
the search might involve, particularly in light of the potential magnitude that the crime of hijacking portends against innocent citizens
as compared with the minor inconvenience imposed on the individual who has elected to "test the system."
It has been suggested that when serious injury is suffered by a
passenger in a hijacking, the burden of proof should be placed
on the airlines to ensure that they have done everything possible
to avert the attack, on the theory that the airline is in a position
to prevent the hijacker from accomplishing his criminal act, while
the passenger is in no way capable of doing so." This theory, of
course, rises in the context of civil liability, but lends further appeal" 384

U.S. at 458.

" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35

(1967).

Quoted with

approval in Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
2*Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFFkLO L. REV. 339 (1972).
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to the need-indeed, to a demand-for the exercise of maximum
security precautions at the nation's airports.
In the foregoing theoretical case the umbrella of the fourth
amendment was invoked by the presence of a law enforcement
officer. But what if the agent himself had detained the subject and
personally searched him?
Except for limited indications to the contrary, most courts have
agreed that evidence obtained as the result of a wrongful search
by a private individual may be admitted into evidence in a criminal
prosecution against the victim of the search, if that search was
not in any way instigated or participated in by government agents.
This is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Burdeau v.
McDowell," wherein the Court held that the protection of the
fourth amendment applies to government action only, its origin
and history clearly showing that it was intended as a restraint upon
the activities of sovereign authority and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies.
The cases arising under airline searches when the searches were
conducted entirely by employees of the airline have been consistent
in their holding that evidence discovered as the result of these
searches is admissible in criminal prosecutions. For example, in
Gold v. United States,2 an airline employee search was upheld as
not being so connected with government participation or influence
that it could be characterized as a search by government agents.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
We conclude that the initial search of the packages by the airline's
employee was not a federal search, but was an independent investigation by the carrier for its own purposes.28
This is also the holding of United States v. Burton,' wherein an
experienced Braniff employee discovered a pistol in the defendant's
luggage after he had been aroused by the fact that the defendant
not only met the profile, but, in addition, his luggage had a peculiar
feel to it. In that case the luggage was opened entirely on the
initiative of the Braniff employee and no federal agents were pres21256 U.S. 465 (1921).
22
23

378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).

Id.at 591.

24341 F. Supp. 302 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
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ent during the search and indeed were not called into the picture
until the suspect was preparing to board his flight.
The opposite result was reached in Corngold v. United States,2
like Gold, a Ninth Circuit case, but with facts entirely different
in that customs agents followed a shipper to the airport and requested the airline to open some packages after the shipper had
left. In that case, the airline employee testified that he had opened
the packages only because the government agents had requested
that he do so and that the government agents actively joined in
the search. The evidence [marijuana] was suppressed at a subsequent criminal prosecution of Corngold.
The most publicized case dealing with the use of the profile as
a tool for the selection of persons to be searched under the pre1973 security program is United States v. Lopez." There was a
general negative reaction to Lopez when it first was decided, but
this was due in large part to the fact that the judge suppressed
as evidence heroin found on the defendant when he was searched
following a high reading on the magnetometer as he was about to
board an aircraft. The case is worth reading and discussing, though,
because it is a creditable memorandum of law by Judge Weinstein,
covering virtually all the issues raised by the use of an antihijacking system.
Consider first what Lopez does in an affirmative sense:
(i) It sustains as constitutional the utilization of the profile
when the characteristics that go into the profile are easily
observable and are operable without the exercise of subjective judgments;
(ii) It accepts for judicial notice the fact that the magnetometer, when operated properly, serves the function for
which it was designed;
(iii) It sustains a limited right to hold in camera investigations
in protecting the secrecy of the profile system;
(iv) It rules that evidence discovered during a weapons frisk
pursuant to the anti-hijacking procedure, insofar as it utilizes the profile correctly, would normally be admissible,
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
21328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); 14 A.L.R. FED. 252 (1973). See also
Validity, under Federal Constitution, of Pre-Flight Procedure Used at Airports
to Prevent Hijacking of Aircraft, 14 A.L.R. FED. 286 (1973).
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even though there had been no consent to the search and
the suspect was in custody of federal agents without a
warrant having been issued for his arrest; and
(v) It sustains the constitutionality under the fourth amendment of the seizure of evidence of crimes other than those
involved in boarding a plane with a weapon when discovered during a frisk conducted in good faith to locate
weapons believed to be present.
We certainly cannot quarrel with these holdings, and indeed,
applaud them.
Almost ironically, the opinion in Lopez dealt with the suppression of the evidence obtained from the search as almost an afterthought. Apparently an employee of Pan American, the airline
through which the screening was being conducted, without authority, had introduced another element-that of ethnic origin-into
the particular profile check being conducted at the time Lopez was
arrested. The record is silent about whether Lopez would have
been detained otherwise, but the fact that led to the detention of
Lopez and his subsequent personal search was that he produced a
high reading on the magnetometer when he walked through it, a
highly objective measure of determining whether a person should
be further searched. It seems to me that having approved the methods used by the marshals in searching Lopez, the judge then threw
the baby out with the bathwater in arriving at his decision.
The judge also ruled that the signs posted at the boarding gates,
notifying the passengers that they and their baggage are subject
to search, did not amount to an implied consent to be searched. I
must disagree with the judge on this point.
As one columnist has noted,"7 everyone desiring to visit the office
of the Supreme Court of the United States, including lawyers, is
required to submit to a search of both the person and the briefcase.
Let us also not forget that any time a passenger embarks on international travel he and his baggage are subject to search by customs
officials in every country which he visits, as well as the customs
officials of his own country when he returns to his port of embarkation.
In my opinion, once a person has been put on notice that air2'7

Buckley, Armed Stewardesses to Deter Hijackers? The Washington Evening

Star & Daily News, Mar. 1, 1973.
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craft hijacking is a federal crime, punishable by death, and that
he and his baggage are subject to search, and he then continues
the boarding process in the face of such a caveat, he has done so
willingly, and I say that with all due regard to the niceties involved
in the relinquishment of fundamental constitutional rights. I take
some comfort in this position from a California state case decided
after Lopez, wherein the California Court of Appeals placed great
weight on the fact that there were signs and announcements in
the boarding area that passenger luggage would be searched, and
sustained the trial judge's finding that the defendant consented to
the search voluntarily and that marijuana found as a result of that
search was not subject to suppression even though a police officer
had assisted in the search."'
Today everyone is subject to the search and the profile, while
still intact, does not remain the critical criteria for determining
who is searched-everybody is. One need only be a casual observer
in any major terminal in the United States to see the anti-hijacking
procedures in operation. To argue that one who freely and willingly
enters the line that forms as baggage and persons are searched,
but later complains that the search was not voluntary, certainly is
far less persuasive today than it was at the time when only a
selected few were required to stand the inspection.

III.

HIJACK PREVENTION IN THE FUTURE

In a lighter vein, as you know Americans have fertile imaginations and we receive anti-hijacking proposals from all walks of
life. One gentleman assured us that he has the hijacking solution
in hand and that all he wants is four per cent of Delta's gross revenues for the next ten years and four free passes anywhere in the
world over the same period of time-this would amount to something over one hundred million dollars-but without giving us a
single clue as to what he has in mind. A convict in a State penitentiary in North Carolina advised us that he spends sixteen hours
a day in his cell and, having had ample time to think it over, he
was confident that the solution to the hijacking problem is the introduction of tear gas into the cabin while the flight crew don
oxygen masks. He even took the time to carefully sketch out a
21 People v. DeStrulle, 28 Cal. App.3d 477, 104 Cal. Rep. 639 (Ct. App. 1972).
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system which he thought might work. Considering the fact that
this gentleman apparently doesn't have much opportunity to travel
at all and wasn't asking for compensation, we thought his attitude
was a charitable one indeed.
Some of the more thoughtful letters concerning anti-hijacking
devices involve suggested means of identification and record keeping which would permit the airlines to keep fairly close tabs on
their passengers. One gentleman suggested that we have identification cards for all passengers that, when placed in a computer,
would give a printout on the person's background and identity.
Matching of fingerprints has been suggested as another idea and,
quite frankly, while we don't know all the answers yet, some of
these thoughts that people have passed along to us, or some variance thereof may provide additional useable solutions to the hijacking dilemma some day.
We have considered some of the legal issues involved in skyjacking and the practical problems that they present, as well as the
responsibility of the airport operator and the airlines, vis-a-vis
their respective security areas. The question remains-have we
taken all reasonable measures for the prevention of skyjacking?
First, let me say that I believe that we are now approaching a
point of diminishing returns with regard to the maintenance of
security in airport terminals insofar as the security "sterilization"
of our passengers is concerned. One must remember that we are
dealing with 531 commercial airports in which 500,000 people
are being processed on a transportation system involving 14,000
flights daily. Of course, we could achieve one hundred per cent
assurance of skyjacking prevention by simply ceasing to fly. Obviously, the answer lies short of such action--or inaction.
Secondly, in Las Vegas terms, the odds are all in the passenger's
favor. As I mentioned a moment ago, in the United States today,
some 14,000 airline flights will be flown-that's 168,000 a month,
or over 2,000,000 a year. How many "attempts" are made annually? Only a handful. But those of the handful that were successful did make spectacular headlines. And alas, as I said at the
outset, those that fail often are relegated to the back pages of our
newspapers, if they are reported at all. And they are failing with
increasing frequency. In 1968 and 1969, eighty-two per cent of
the attempts were successful; in 1970, sixty-seven per cent; in 1971,
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forty-four per cent; in 1972, only thirty per cent; and in 1973 to
date, none have succeeded. In other words, last year seven out of
ten tries ended in complete failure.
And the attempt is no longer very profitable. Of the more than
nine million dollars paid to hijackers to date, if Cuba returns the
two million dollars to Southern as it has promised to do, ninety-five
per cent will have been recovered. And five hijackers have been
killed, six more have been shot and still three more chose suicide
as a way out. Hardly a very profitable or permanent way of making
a living.
On the other hand, we do not know how long the traveling
public will accept thorough searches of their bodies and their
personal belongings, as well as the occasional attendant delays.
We are quite aware of the outraged protestations of certain segments of the population, contending that these searches are illegal
or otherwise infringe on individual liberties. While still minor, over
a period of time these protests may increase.
We also fear the threat of deterioration in customer relations.
Our industry has been built upon service, convenience, courtesy
and safety, and these attributes must not be lost. Security has become the latest addition to this list. We must convince our passengers that security is a necessity, even though it may well interfere
with convenience, and that flights may occasionally be delayed.
With the strengthening of law enforcement at the airport, these
terminal areas may soon display a more secure environment than
those we experience in the residential areas of our large metropolitan centers.
We have noted that prosecution of hijackers has taken on new
intensity, and that our courts are meting out increasingly severe
and more appropriate sentences for convicted hijackers. Accordingly, it is my feeling that we must now concentrate on the most
conspicuous aspect of deterrence, and that is the elimination of
safe havens to which a skyjacker can proceed. The recent agreement with Cuba is a refreshing break in the international political
logjam which has prevented agreement for extradition among certain countries. We must renew with vigor our effort to obtain
international agreement for extradition and effective prosecution
of skyjackers.
When there remains no place where a skyjacker can anticipate
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refuge, the problem will be much nearer solution. No country must
allow a perpetrator of a skyjacking, with its inherent endangerment
to so many innocent lives, to go unpunished. In addition, I would
strongly urge that the President of the United States be given
discretionary powers to suspend all air service between the United
States and nations that harbor air criminals, and that he should
be strongly encouraged to exercise that authority.
While I have avoided any philosophical comment in my discussion of the problem, it is incumbent upon me to make a very
few observations which may serve to place the measures implemented, and the measures to be implemented, in perspective. So
long as the industry, our government and the vast majority of
people in our country place the value of human life above property,
there can be no certain and final solution to the skyjacking problem. I submit that we cannot and must not change our priority
of values.
Short of playing Russian roulette with each psychotic hijacker,
we must deal with each problem as it arises within certain acceptable parameters in the hope that the example made will deter the
next psychotic hijacker. The measures being taken today, along
with renewed effort to obtain satisfactory international agreement
for extradition and prosecution, are within these parameters.
While many of the preventive measures now being taken reduce
the necessity to balance life against property, it is possible today,
and will remain possible in the foreseeable future, for a person
using reasonably sophisticated means to commandeer a commercial
airliner and obtain compliance with his demands. Knowing full
well that were I to publicly suggest such means today, in all probability tomorrow they would be tried somewhere, I will not attempt
such a recitation. But I am certain that those of you with imagination can envision numerous techniques without my prompting.
The threat to life is the initial consideration in an airline's handling of each skyjacking attempt; it must-and it will-remain so.

